Introduction: In the previous parts, we discussed David Chalmers' ideas about the Hard Problem of Consciousness and derived definitions of the characteristics and information we need to develop the way proposed by Chalmers: by combining information theory with the theory of consciousness. We concluded that matter has some characteristics that manifest themselves exclusively through interaction. And information is only a product of observation and comparison of the characteristics of different parts of matter with each other. This means that information is not a natural component of all processes but rather a way of correlating various phenomena.
However, our question is about consciousness. In this area, we note that results are possible only when they are perceived. To clarify this concept, let's delve into quantum mechanics and consider Schrödinger's cat paradox. This paradox suggests that a cat exists in a superposition of being alive and dead, just as water in a glass can teeter on the brink of overflowing while simultaneously not spilling over. Although at first glance it seems that uncertainties and superpositions have practically no place in our macrocosmic reality and the information world, since we can determine the outcome of an event, this approach misses the sequence of characteristic-comparison-information that we have defined.
Even when we know about the glass's volume and the water it contains, destiny remains predetermined if we overlook the process of measurement. This brings us to the critical point of measurement-induced changes. If we are aware of the volume of the glass, it implies that a measurement or observation has already taken place. All predictive potential is diminished in the absence of this observation. In essence, an encounter fails to produce a result if it avoids fixation and observation. Returning to the experiment with one quantum, even if we conditionally bring fire to matter, we will not change it if we do not observe it.
What is observation? According to panpsychism, which suggests that everything has consciousness, everything can observe itself and make the existence of the result of interaction possible. To illustrate this concept, let's imagine a conscious particle. Imagine burning this particle with fire. Then, as we know, the temperature of the particle, less than the temperature of the fire, will gradually increase until the particle burns. In our case, combustion will mean the destruction of the particle structure.
Now an intriguing question arises: the conscious particle should feel the temperature rise, but how? After all, the particle can't use information, and information is necessary for experiencing the experience. The thesis seems doubtful at first, but upon closer examination, it becomes obvious. Let us look at the concept that, to paraphrase Nagel, means "to be something", in our case, to be a particle with temperature X. When the temperature changes, so does the state of the particle, its experience, and what it means to be it. But at which point will the particle be able to notice this?
The first explanation is that the particle has an information scale, or memory, of being itself at different temperatures. As a result, we come to two useful conclusions at once: to have information, you need to have memory, and without it, it’s impossible to determine the various stages of experience, which is to have experience. This introduces the second thesis, which is illustrated by the following statement: if it is impossible to distinguish colors, such as red, then it is impossible to distinguish between different moments and compare them. This results in experience being impossible, which leads to consciousness being impossible. For such a conscious particle, when combustion occurs, there will be only "homogeneous something" while it exists and "nothing" when it is destroyed, then it will not be able to realize its destruction since its consciousness will leave with the destruction.
Combining the two conclusions made, we can formulate the following thesis: consciousness (experience, or qualia) is possible only if there is memory. And in the presence of memory, observation becomes possible, which makes the existence of characteristics of amnesic objects (objects without memory) possible as well. Observation here is an interaction that, as a result, changes the structure that serves as a memory for consciousness.
It may seem strange that we have moved away from Chalmers' dualism. However, this is a logical step. Even though consciousness in our understanding may be inherent only in systems with memory, amnesic objects most likely have some semblance of consciousness, though homogeneous. This is "preconsciousness," since it determines only the existence of an object. This could be described as an endless noise of interference, only silent. This is another property of matter, which, in the presence of memory, acquires the outlines we are familiar with. It is not entirely true to say that we are moving away from naturalistic dualism; it is just that immaterial consciousness here can be reduced to a more matter-related level.
In conclusion, preconsciousness arises not only when processing information; it always exists, but at different levels. This depends on the level of organization of the object. Let's recall our experiment with a piece of wood. Burned, it does not cease to exist at all; only its organization disappears at this level, and smaller details (atoms, elementary particles) still exist. The world of pre-consciousness can be represented as a huge matrix of 0 and 1; at different points in space at different levels, pre-consciousness can either exist or not; that is, its measure shows the level of organization of the system. When the system is organized into an object that has memory, consciousness arises, which puts the world in an informational relative form, where there are differences between different points of space and where conditional quanta can exist. This is our world. There is logic here, and we can construct similar theories. In this case, all systems with memory also live in it, from computer technology to living organisms. However, it is worth remembering that any logical system is imperfect, as Kurt Gödel proved.
The theory above requires improvements and proofs. However, its positive aspects are that it is verifiable and can be used in practice. Although the main topic of the work was consciousness, information in general may also be of interest. For example, with information, one can explain the problem of the impracticability of quantum laws in systems with a large number of particles.
P.S.: It is worth considering existing thought experiments from this point of view. The "Chinese Room", a challenge to the notion of strong artificial intelligence and the idea of computer language, can be refuted only based on Chalmers' work; "Mary's Room" can be interpreted according to Ramachandran and Hubbard. The "philosophical zombie", although it is an important reference point in our logic, cannot exist in our world, and its existence cannot be fixed in another.
Bibliography :
Gödel, Kurt F. "Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme." 1931.
Husserl, Edmund G. A. "Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins." 1928.
Searle, John R. "Is the brain’s mind a computer program?" 1980.